In this paper, we consider a company where surplus follows a rather general diffusion process and whose objective is to maximize expected discounted dividend payments. With each dividend payment there are transaction costs and taxes and it is shown in [7] that under some reasonable assumptions, optimality is achieved by using a lump sum dividend barrier strategy, i.e. there is an upper barrierū * and a lower barrier u * so that whenever surplus reachesū * , it is reduced to u * through a dividend payment. However, these optimal barriers may be unacceptably low from a solvency point of view. It is argued that in that case one should still we should look for a barrier strategy, but with barriers that satisfy a given constraint. We propose a solvency constraint similar to that in [6] ; whenever dividends are paid out the probability of ruin within a fixed time T and with the same strategy in the future, should not exceed a predetermined level ε. It is shown how optimality can be achieved under this constraint, and numerical examples are given.
Introduction
Finding optimal dividend strategies is a classical problem in the financial and actuarial literature. The idea is that the company wants to pay some of its surplus as dividends, and the problem is to find a dividend strategy that maximizes the expected total discounted dividends received by the shareholders. The typical time horizon is until ruin occurs, i.e. until the surplus is negative for the first time.
However, left to their own, financial institutions may make decisions that can jeopardize their solvency, and those with a claim on the company, e.g. account holders of a bank or customers of an insurance company, have an unacceptably high probability of loosing all or parts of their claims. As a consequence, most countries impose some regulation on financial companies, and in addition the companies themselves will usually have their own, albeit sometimes lax, capital requirements.
The task for the management is therefore not to maximize expected discounted dividends as such, but to do it under proper solvency constraints. One such constraint was suggested in [6] , and we shall apply the same idea in this paper. We also let the capital of the company dividends continuously but only at discrete time epochs. Therefore, a strategy can be described by π = (τ where τ π n and ξ π n denote the times and amounts of dividends. Thus, when applying the strategy π, the resulting surplus process X π t is given by 
2)
The process X π is left continuous with right limits, so when applying e.g. Itô's formula, it will be on the right continuous with left limit version {X t+ }. Also, we define ∆X t = X t+ − X t .
Sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of (2.2) are assumptions A1 and A2 below.
Definition 2.1. A strategy π is said to be admissible if (i) 0 ≤ τ π 1 and for n ≥ 1, τ π n+1 > τ π n on {τ π n < ∞}.
(ii) τ π n is a stopping time with respect to {F t } t≥0 , n = 1, 2. . . .
(iii) ξ π n is measurable with respect to F τ π n , n = 1, 2. . . .
(iv) P lim
n→∞ τ π n ≤ T = 0, ∀T ≥ 0.
(v) 0 < ξ π n ≤ X π τn .
We denote the set of all admissible strategies by Π.
With each admissible strategy π we define the corresponding ruin time as where by P x we mean the probability measure conditioned on X 0 = x. V π (x) represents the expected total discounted dividends received by the shareholders until ruin when the initial reserve is x. Since we deal with the optimization problem on the time interval [0, τ π ], we can assume without loss of generality that X π t ≡ 0 for t > τ π . Define the optimal return function
and the optimal strategy, if it exists, by π * . Then V π * (x) = V * (x). When X π 0 ≥ū,
and for every n ≥ 2, τ π n is defined as above. With a given lump sum dividend barrier strategy πū ,u , the corresponding value function is denoted by Vū ,u (x).
The importance of the lump sum dividend barrier strategies is exemplified in e.g. Theorem 2.1 below, proved in [7] . In order to present the theorem, we make a list of assumptions.
A1. | µ(x) | + | σ(x) |≤ C(1 + x) for all x ≥ 0 and some C > 0.
A2. µ(x) and σ(x) are continuously differentiable and Lipschitz continuous, and the derivatives µ (x) and σ (x) are Lipschitz continuous for all x ≥ 0.
A3. σ 2 (x) > 0 for all x ≥ 0.
A4. µ (x) ≤ λ for all x ≥ 0, where λ is the discounting rate.
Define the operator L by
for g ∈ C 2 (0, ∞). It is well known, see e.g. [7] , that under the assumptions A1-A3 any solution of Lg = 0 is in C 2 (0, ∞). Let g 1 (x) and g 2 (x) be two independent solutions of Lg(x) = 0, chosen so that g(x) = g 1 (0)g 2 (x)−g 2 (0)g 1 (x) has g (0) > 0. Any such solution will be called a canonical solution. Then any solution LV (x) = 0 with V (0) = 0 and V (0) > 0 is of the form V (x) = cg(x), c > 0.
Consider the following set of problems.
B1:
LV (x) = 0, 0 < x <ū * ,
V (x) = V (ū * ) + k(x −ū * ), x >ū * .
B2:
V (ū * ) = V (u * ) + k(ū * − u * ) − K, V (ū * ) = k, V (u * ) = k.
B3:
V (ū * ) = kū * − K, V (ū * ) = k.
Note that k and K are equivalent to in [7] . Theorem 2.1. (Theorem 2.1 in [7] ) Assume that A1 − A4 hold. Then exactly one of the following three cases will occur.
(i) B1+B2 have a unique solution for unknown V (x),ū * and u * and V * (x) = V (x) = Vū * ,u * (x) for all x ≥ 0. Thus the lump sum dividend barrier strategy π * = πū * ,u * is an optimal strategy.
(ii) B1+B3 have a unique solution for unknown V (x) and V * (x) = V (x) = Vū * ,0 (x) for all x ≥ 0. Thus the lump sum dividend barrier strategy π * = πū * ,0 is an optimal strategy.
(iii) There does not exist an optimal strategy, but
and this limit exists and is finite for every x ≥ 0. In terms of a canonical solution,
.
Remark 2.1. As pointed out in Remark 2.2e in [7] , if lim x→∞ g (x) = ∞ then either B1+B2 or B1+B3 apply, hence an optimal solution exists. That lim x→∞ g (x) = ∞ is almost a necessary condition for existence of a solution can be shown as in Proposition 2.4 of [8] . Therefore, for simplicity we will typically assume that lim x→∞ g (x) = ∞.
Here is a useful sufficient condition for lim x→∞ g (x) = ∞. The proof is given in the appendix.
Proposition 2.1. Assume A1-A4 and that there exists an x 0 ≥ 0 and an ε > 0 so that
Then for any canonical solution g of Lg(x) = 0,
Remark 2.2. Arguing as in the end of the proof of Theorem 4.1, it follows that if there exists an x 0 ≥ 0 so that
then lim x→∞ g (x) < ∞. Therefore, Proposition 2.1 is quite sharp.
Optimality under payout restrictions
Consider e.g. an insurance company that wants to use the optimal barriersū * and u * for its dividend payments. However, when policyholders pay their premiums in advance, they expect to have their claims covered. It is therefore reasonable that the company should not be allowed to pay dividends if that makes the surplus too small. One natural condition is that the surplus is not allowed to be less than some u 0 > 0 after a dividend payment. Mathematically, for a policy π such a restriction can be written as
Let Π 0 denote the set of all admissible strategies satisfying (3.1). Define the new optimal return function V * 0 (x) as
Our aim is to find the optimal return function V * 0 (x) and the optimal strategy π 0 ∈ Π 0 such that
Following Remark 2.1 we assume that lim x→∞ g (x) = ∞ so that either B1+B2 or B1+B3 have a solution. Trivially, if B1+B2 have a solution V (x) for some c * ,ū * and u * ≥ u 0 , the optimal strategy in case (i) of Theorem 2.1 is feasible under the constraint (3.1). Then V * 0 (x) = V (x) and the optimal strategy is as in case (i) of Theorem 2.1. Therefore we consider the cases when B1+B2 have a solution V (x) for some c * ,ū * and u * < u 0 , or the case when B1+B3 have a solution V (x) for some c * ,ū * and u * = 0. In these cases, the optimal strategy given by Theorem 2.1 does not satisfy the constraint (3.1). Consequently, we need to look for the optimal return function and the optimal strategy again. To this end, consider the problem for unknown V andū 0 :
C:
LV (x) = 0, 0 < x <ū 0 ,
The following result is proved in the appendix.
Theorem 3.1. Assume that A1-A4 hold and that lim x→∞ g (x) = ∞. Let u 0 > u * , where u * is given in Theorem 2.1. Then Problem C has a unique solution for unknown V andū 0 and
where V * 0 (x) is defined in (3.2) . Thus the lump sum dividend barrier strategy πū 0 ,u 0 is an optimal strategy in Π 0 . Also, for given u 1 so that u * < u 0 < u 1 , for the corresponding optimal upper barriers it holds thatū * <ū 0 <ū 1 .
According to Theorems 2.1 and 3.1, for a given lower barrier u 0 the optimal strategy is the lump sum barrier strategy πũ ,u 1 where,
Here (ū * , u * ) is as in Theorem 2.1, whileū 0 is as in Theorem 3.1. This addresses the problem of not being allowed to pay dividends that brings the capital too far down. The next result looks at the other end. What if the company cannot make a dividend payment when it wants, but has to postpone it until capital reaches a higher level? Letū 1 >ũ and let Π 1 be the set of all admissible policies satisfying
i.e. all policies so that paying dividends when capital is less thanū 1 as well as reducing it below u 1 through a dividend payment are ruled out. Define the new optimal return function V * 1 (x) as
Consider the problem for unknown V .
D:
LV (x) = 0, 0 < x <ū 1 ,
We then have the following theorem. It is proved in the Appendix.
Theorem 3.2. Assume that A1-A4 hold and that lim x→∞ g (x) = ∞. Let u 0 andū 1 >ũ be given, whereũ is defined in (3.3) . Then Problem D has a unique solution for unknown V and
where V * 1 (x) is defined in (3.5) and u 1 in (3.3). Thus the lump sum dividend barrier strategy πū 1 ,u 1 is an optimal strategy in Π 1
The messages of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 is that if the optimal barriers are too small, it is still optimal to use lump sum barrier strategies with the barriers as close to the optimal ones as possible in some sense. Therefore, we should look for barrier strategies, but with barriers sufficiently large to satisfy solvency requirements. This is the topic of Section 4.
Optimality under a solvency constraint
Having argued in Section 3 that barrier strategies are optimal also under reasonable constraints, we will in this section show how optimal barriers can be found that satisfy a natural solvency restriction. To describe this restriction, let T < ∞ be a fixed time horizon and define the survival probability as
where as before P x means that X 0 = x and πū ,u is the lump sum dividend strategy with barriers u and u. For a given ruin tolerance ε we say that the strategy πū ,u is solvency admissible if
Note that φū ,u (T, u) = φū ,u (T,ū). This means that for a solvency admissible strategy πū ,u , at the time of paying a dividend the probability of survival during the next time interval of length T using the same strategy cannot be smaller than 1 − ε. Also note that even when case (iii) of Theorem 2.1 applies, in principle condition (4.1) may not hold for any δ-optimal dividend strategy. The reason for this is that u(ū) may be bounded asū → ∞. The following result shows that even in case (iii) there will exist a δ-optimal dividend strategy. It is proved in the appendix. 
By this result we can choose a u so large that for any δ > 0 there is a δ-optimal lump sum dividend barrier that satisfies the constraint (4.1). Consequently, from now on it is assumed that lim x→∞ g (x) = ∞ as in Remark 2.1.
As in [6] it can be proved that if there exists a
with initial value
and boundary value for t > 0,
is the survival probability. Here v t means the partial derivative w.r.t. t and so on. In fact it is well known, see e.g. [5] , that under assumptions A1-A3 any solution of
Let us discuss how the optimal solvency admissible strategy can be found. By definition, for u > 0, clearly
be the survival probability when there is no control. If φ(T, u) ≤ 1 − ε then u cannot be the lower barrier of a solvency admissible dividend strategy since paying dividends surely increases the ruin probability. However, if φ(T, u) > 1 − ε then for sufficiently largeū, πū ,u will be a solvency admissible strategy. The lower bound u m for the lower barrier in a solvency admissible strategy is therefore of interest, and it is given by
It is easy to show that if there exists a C 1,2 ((0, T ) × (0, ∞)) function w that satisfies
and boundary value for t > 0, w(t, 0) = 0 and lim
then w(T, x) = φ(T, x). Again, by A1-A3 any solution of (4.5) is C 1,2 ((0, T ) × (0, ∞)).
We are now ready for the optimality algorithm. It is assumed that lim x→∞ g (x) = ∞.
1. Calculate the optimal V * (x) with corresponding barriersū * and u * .
2. Calculate φū * ,u * (T, u * ). If φū * ,u * (T, u * ) ≥ 1 − ε, the optimal strategy satisfies the solvency constraint and we are done. If not continue to step 3.
3. Find u m as the unique solution of φ(T, u m ) = 1 − ε. This can be done using a one dimensional search.
4. Let δ > 0 be a small number, and set u i = u m + iδ, i = 1, 2, . . ..
5.
For each u i , find the corresponding optimal upper barrier by solving Problem C, and call
Also letc i be the scaling factor so that the solution is V * 0 (x) =c i g(x) for x ≤ū i . On the other hand, if φ u i ,u i (T, u i ) < 1 − ε, increase u i in steps of δ until the solvency constraint is satisfied. Let u i be the corresponding upper barrier andc i the scaling factor found by solving Problem D.
6. Do this untilc i falls significantly. Then let c ε be the highestc i andū ε and u ε be the correspondingū i and u i respectively. The optimal solvency admissible strategy is then πū ε,u ε and the corresponding value function is
The equations (4.2) and (4.5) together with their respective initial and boundary conditions are not easily solvable, but taking the Laplace transform brings them into ordinary differential equations. To see how, consider (4.2) and definẽ
Straightforward calculations, using (4.3), gives thatṽ satisfies
A particular solution is given byṽ p (s, x) = s −1 . Letṽ 1 (s, x) andṽ 2 (s, x) be independent solutions of the homogeneous equation in (4.8). Then we havẽ
where a 1 and a 2 are determined from the initial and boundary conditions. Now v(t, 0) = 0 implies thatṽ(s, 0) = 0 as well, and v(t,ū) = v(t, u) implies thatṽ(s,ū) =ṽ(s, u). Therefore, after some straightforward calculations
h (t) be the inverse Laplace transform. Then L s −1 (t) = 1 and using the Laplace transform property for integrals, we get that
where
Therefore, if we letw 1 (s, x) andw 2 (s, x) be two independent solutions of the homogeneous equation, and assume thatŵ i (s) = lim x→∞wi (s, x), i = 1, 2 exist, theñ
. Inversion formulas are similar to those above.
Example 4.1 Assume that µ and σ 2 are constants. Then it is easy to see that
Plugging this into (4.9) and (4.10) givesṽ(s, x). Inverting this Laplace transform is unfortunately not straightforward.
This can be inverted using standard tables for the Laplace transform. However, the solution can also be obtained by other methods, see e.g. [3] p.196, and is given by
Therefore, u m is given as the unique solution of (in x)
Numerical Solutions
In order to provide a complete numerical solution to the problem, several differential equations, both ordinary and partial, have to be solved. For problems B, C and D it is necessary to find a canonical solution g, either analytically, or if that is not possible or practical, numerically. In the latter case, the Runge-Kutta method can be used, together with linear interpolation between the grid points, this for g, g and g . In case the assumption of Proposition 2.1 does not hold, the numerical solution can be helpful to assess whether lim x→∞ g (x) = ∞ or not.
Problems B1+B2 or B1+B3. In [7] it is shown how this can be reduced to a one dimensional search problem, but for completeness and since the notation is somewhat different, we include it here. This method will also reveal whether an optimal solution exists.
1. Find the x * ∈ (0, ∞), if it exists, so that g (x * ) = 0. If g is convex, we set x * = 0, and if it is concave we set x * = ∞. In the second case there is no solution, and by Lemma A.2b, x * = 0 is equivalent to µ(0) ≤ 0, so this case is easy to establish.
2. Choose x < x * and let c = k g (x) so that cg (x) = k. 
Calculate k(y
). If this is larger than K increase x. Otherwise decrease x.
Repeat the process until a solution is obtained, or until it is clear that there is no solution.
In case there is a solution, upon convergence u * = x,ū * = y and V * (x) = cg(x) for x ≤ū * .
Problem C. Assume it is clear that lim x→∞ g (x) = ∞. Then the following easy recipe works:
3. Repeat the process until convergence is obtained. Upon convergence,ū 0 = x and V (x) = cg(x) for x ≤ū 0 .
Problem D. The unique solution is given in (A.15) in the appendix.
The function v(t, x) of (4.2)-(4.4). This is a standard PDE, but with nonstandard boundary conditions. It turns out that the Crank-Nicolson algorithm together with an adaption of the Thomas algorithm to solve tridiagonal systems are well suited for this problem. For more details on the Crank-Nicolson and the Thomas algorithms the reader can consult [1] . To explain how this adaption works, let h be the grid length and ih, i = 0, 1, . . . , m the gridpoints so that mh =ū. Similarly, let k be the grid length and jk, j = 0, 1, . . . , n the gridpoints so that nk = T Previously k is defined as the tax rate, but there should be no ambiguity so we follow the standard notation. Let σ 2 i = σ 2 (ih) and µ i = µ(ih), i = 0, 1, . . . , m. With v j i an approximation to v(ih, jk), the Crank-Nicolson finite difference scheme is 1
Collecting terms, this can be written as
where with r = k h 2 ,
To start the iterations we use the intial value v(0, x) = 1 giving v 0 i = 1 as well, and so the d 0 i , i = 0, 1, . . . , m can be calculated. Now to the Thomas algorithm. To use it, for numerical stability we should have
Let us check this condition:
In order to have case 1 at all gridpoints, we can let
and then for good convergence, a typical choice of r is r = 
for unknown p i+1 and q i+1 . Using this in (5.1) with i − 1 instead of i, we get
Comparing (5.3) and (5.4) gives
The boundary condition v(t, 0) = 0 implies that 0 = v 0 = p 1 v 1 + q 1 , which is satisfied if p 1 = q 1 = 0. We can now use (5.5) to recursively calculate (p i , q i ), i = 2, . . . , m. Then using (5.3) backwards yields
The boundary condition v(t,ū) = v(t, u) implies that v m = v l where hl = u. Therefore,
We can now go backwards using (5.3) again.
Remark 5.1 Since in the Crank-Nicolson method k = rh 2 , the space grid is typically much coarser than the time grid. In our problem we are searching for optimal points in the space variable, and therefore a fully implicit scheme with k = rh for some r may be more suitable, since this allows for a finer space grid with the same computation time. The relation (5.1) will still apply, but with different coefficients, and so the Thomas algorithm is again applicable. However, we have not tried this method.
The function w(t, x) of (4.5)-(4.7). This is basically the same problem as that discussed above, except that instead of the nonstandard boundary condition v(t,ū) = v(t, u), we impose the standard boundary condition w(t,ū) = 1 for some largeū. This will result in a slightly overestimate of the survival probability, but ifū is chosen large enough, it should not be a real problem. Deciding whenū is large enough is not an obvious task, but one way may be to keep x fixed at a moderate value, and then try with increasingū until the solution w(0, x) stabilizes. Given theū, the Crank-Nicolson algorithm together with the standard Thomas algorithm should work fine. Also, to find w analytically is easier than to find v, as we saw in Example 4.1.
Numerical examples
In this section we will give two numerical examples where optimal solutions with and without the solvency constraint are compared. In all plots, solid lines are for the case with the solvency constraint, while dashed lines are without solvency constraints. Each figure is split into three panels, where the first panel shows the optimal upper and lower barriers, both without and with the solvency constraint. The second panel shows the amount of dividends paid each time, i.e. u ε − u ε andū * − u * . The third panel shows the constants c ε and c * so that the value functions equal V ε (x) = c ε g(x), x ≤ū ε and V * (x) = c * g(x), x ≤ū * , where g is a canonical solution to be specified in each example. This means that for x ≤ū * , 1 − cε c * is the percentage loss of value due to the solvency constraint.
Before we give the examples, a few words on the numerics. All programs were written in R, but with subprograms in C for the number crunching. The simple algorithm described in Section 4 had to be modified. The reason is that the finite difference scheme (5.1) for solving (4.2) is accurate of order 2. However, a perturbation of size h of the boundary condition of a PDE will in general induce a change in the solution of order O(h). Experimentally this seems to be the case also in this case for perturbations ofū and u, i.e. the most accurate numerical evaluations of the survival probability φū ,u for a given lump sum strategy πū ,u seem to come when u andū are both nodes on the PDE grid. This is especially true for u. The general idea behind the program is therefore to minimize the calculations of off-grid u andū by defining the grids so that u is on the grid. To find the smallest solvency admissibleū for a fixed u > u m , the program iterates as follows:
1. Start with a fairly coarse grid and find two adjacent pointsv 1 <w 1 so that according to the numerical solution πw 1 ,u is solvency admissible, while πv 1 ,u is not. Then one iteration of the secant method is used to find aū 1 betweenv 1 andw 1 .
2. Repeat the procedure with a finer grid, and find adjacent pointsv 2 <w 2 with the same properties asv 1 andw 1 . Since the grid has changed, so has the numerical solution of the ruin probability, and frequently this resulted inv 2 >w 1 .
3. Repeat the process a certain number of times. We repeated it until there was about 100 million nodes, where we used k = 1 2 h 2 . Although a bit circumstantial, this routine was in fact quite efficient in terms of total running time. As is seen from several of the figures below, the upper estimated values ofū are sometimes quite erratic. However, this does not matter much since the corresponding values of c ε do not vary much. When comparing different plots it is important to note that the y-axis varies, and when the span on the y-axis is very small the results may look more erratic than they actually are.
Example 6.1 Let µ(x) = µ and σ(x) = σ be constants, so that (2.1) becomes
By Proposition 2.1, lim x→∞ g (x) = ∞, hence an optimal strategy always exists.
In In the figures 4 of these are kept fixed, while one is varying. In the discussion below,ū is generic for both the unconstrained upper barrierū * and the constrainedū ε , and similar with u.
In Figure 1 , the discounting factor λ is varied. When there is no solvency constraint, we see from the first panel that both upper and lower barriers decrease as λ increases, which reflects the fact that with large values of λ early payments are important, since later payments are heavily discounted. When λ is small, the solvency constraint is not binding due to the long term perspective, and hence the necessity to avoid early ruin provides sufficiently large barriers. As λ increases, the constraint becomes binding, and the lower barrier even increases. The reason for this is that with a given constraint, there is more to gain by decreasing the upper barrier u ε a lot, even if that means a small increase in the lower barrier u ε . However, it is interesting to see from the middle panel that the actual payoutū − u is not much affected by the solvency constraint. From the right panel, we see that the relative impact of the solvency constraint on the values c * and c ε increases quite a lot with λ, but for moderate values of λ it only causes small reductions in the value of the company.
In Figure 2 the time horizon T varies. Without the solvency constraint, the optimal solution is independent of T , which is also seen from the figure. For small T , the optimal solution gives sufficiently high survivial probability, hence the solvency constraint is not binding. As T increases, with the solvency constraint both the lower and upper barriers increase, but it is seen from the middle panel that the actual payout is again not much affected by the constraint. Why the payout first goes down and then increases we cannot explain. The ruggednes of the graph in the middle panel is due to numerical issues as discussed above. However, looking at the scale on the y-axis, we see that the variations are not severe. From the right panel it is seen that although the barriers are much influenced by the solvency constraint, the actual values c ε are far less so.
In Figure 3 the retention rate k varies. As k increases, the amount received, k(ū − u) − K, gets positive for lower amountsū − u paid, and so both barriers decrease with k, both in the unconstrained and the constrained case. The effect of the solvency constraint is just to increase the barriers, but from the middle panel we see that again the payoutū − u is not much affected. From the right panel it is seen that the actual value of the company is not much affected neither.
In Figure 4 the fixed cost K is varied. Since for K large, the payoutū − u must be large in order for the dividend received, k(ū − u) − K, to be positive, the optimal payout must increase with K, which is confirmed in the middle panel. For the rest, the picture is much the same as before, with the solvency constrained barriers lying above those without the solvency constraint, but with the payoutū − u rather unaffected. Also, as seen from the right panel, the solvency constraint does not reduce the value of the company by very much.
Finally, in Figure 5 the ruin tolerance ε varies. For sufficient large values of ε the solvency constraint is not binding, but as soon as the constraint becomes binding (read the x-axis from right to left), the picture is much the same as before with both lower and upper barriers increased due to the solvency constraint, but with payoutsū−u almost the same, and values c ε moderately lower than the optimal c * . When the solvency constraint is binding, the somewhat rugged behaviour of the curves in the first two panels is again due to numerical issues, but it is seen from the right panel that the optimal values c ε is not much influenced, hence these numerical issues are rather unproblematic.
The tentative conclusion we can draw from this example is that the solvency constraint can have a quite large impact on the optimal barriers, but except in rather extreme cases, the impact on the actual payoutū − u as well as on the value c ε versus c * , is much more modest. This is good news for the shareholders, since what counts for them is how much smaller c ε is than c * , i.e. their "loss" due to the solvency constraint. Figure 6 shows the values of V ε (x) and V * (x) for the standard parameter choice. This gave (ū ε , u ε ) = (4.65, 3.13) and (ū * , u * ) = (3.81, 2.22). Not so easy to see from the figure, but V * (x) is concave up to x = 2.82 and then convex. As of V ε (x) it is also concave up to x = 2.82, and then convex up toū ε . However, V ε (ū ε −) = 0.978 > V ε (ū ε +) = k = 0.95, and so V ε is not convex from x = 2.82. That V ε (ū ε −) ≥ V ε (ū ε +) is a general fact, proved in Lemma A.6 in the appendix. 
Example 6.2 Let the basic income process follow the linear Brownian motion
and assume that assets are invested in a risky investment so that the dynamics of the noncontrolled process is dX t = dP t + X t dR t .
We assume that R is a Black-Scholes investment generating process, i.e. R t = (λ−α)t+σ R W R,t , and that W P and W R are independent. Here λ can be seen as the market rate, also used for discounting, while α is a proportional cost associated with the investment. We can write X as (same weak solution)
where W is a Brownian motion. By Proposition 2.1, lim x→∞ g (x) = ∞, hence an optimal strategy exists when α > 0. Actually, using arguments similar to those in Section 3 in [7] together with the solutions given in the appendix in [9] , it can be proved that an optimal strategy exists if and only if α > 0. Again using the solutions in that appendix, a canonical solution can be found, but it is complicated so we used the more convenient Runge Kutta method to obtain a numerical solution of g(x), scaled so that g (0) = 1.
In Figures 7-12 µ = σ P = 1, σ R = 0.25 and α = 0.02. The other parameters used are the same as in Example 6.1, and in the figures 5 of these are kept fixed, while one is varying.
In Figure 7 the discounting factor λ is varied. This is a somewhat different situation from that in Figure 1 . Ignoring the random elements, in Example 1 the only income is the linear µ, which is heavily deflated with an increasing λ. In this example there is in addition an investment income λ − α, which is exponential in nature and therefore partially offsets an increase in λ. When λ is small, the linear income µ dominates, but as λ increases the exponential investment income takes over. This can explain the middle panel in Figure 7 , where for small λ the payout decreases with λ as in Figure 1 , but as λ increases it starts to increase again. From the left panel we see that the upper barrier starts to increase when λ gets big both in the unconstrained and in the constrained case. However, from the right panel it is seen that the overall effect of increasing λ is somewhat smaller in Figure 7 than in Figure 1 , which is to be expected. Figures 8-11 do not differ very much from Figures 2-5 , except that the effect of the solvency constraint seems even less serious here. In Figures 8 and 11 (as well as in Figure 7 ), the solvency constraint caused some ruggedness due to numerical issues, but again looking at the corresponding right panels shows that this is of no importance.
In Figure 12 , the effect of varying the cost factor α is shown. With small α, the investment return λ−α is almost as large as the discounting factor λ, and therefore there is no urgency to pay out dividends, hence the barriers can be set high, and the solvency constraint is not binding. As α increases, it is more urgent to pay dividends, and therefore the optimal unconstrained barriers will not satisfy the solvency constraint. Again the payoutsū − u are almost unaffected by the solvency constraint, and from the right panel we see that the reduction in value due to the solvency constraint is not very large.
The conclusion here is much the same as in Example 6.1, the solvency constraint can have a fairly large impact on the optimal policy, but the actual payout as well as the value of the company are only moderately affected.
We also tried with an "investment risk free" version, i.e. with σ R = 0 so that
However, this gave much the same results, indicating the the results are quite robust. 
Appendix
In this appendix we will prove Proposition 2.1, Theorems 3.1-3.2 and Theorem 4.1. To do so we need the following lemmas, which are the same as Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2 in [7] . Lemma A.2 Let µ(x) and σ(x) satisfy A2 − A4 and let f satisfy Lf (x) = 0, f (0) = 0 and f (x) > 0 for somex > 0. a) f is strongly increasing. b) There is an x * ≥ 0 (possibly taking the value infinity) so that f is concave on (0, x * ) and convex on (x * , ∞). In particular x * = 0 if and only if µ(0) ≤ 0 and trivially f (x * ) = 0 when 0 < x * < ∞.
Proof of Proposition 2.1. To keep initial conditions fixed, we restrict the definition of a canonical solution to mean that g(0) = 0 and g (0) = 1. First note that for any δ > 0,
and therefore it follows from Lemma 2.3 in [7] that it is sufficient to prove that for any a, a canonical solution of
By Lemma A.2b, such a canonical solution f is either ultimately convex or ultimately concave. In either case there exists a c ≤ ∞ so that lim x→∞ f (x) = c and lim
Assume that c < ∞. Then, since
there must exist a sequence {x n } with
Then, considering only the leading terms,
But this contradicts A1, hence c = ∞ and we are done. The next step is to prove that Problem C really has a solution.
Lemma A.3 Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.1, Problem C has exactly one solution and u 0 > x * , where x * is given in Lemma A.2.
Proof. We are looking for a solution (c,ū 0 ) of
For given c > 0, consider the equation
is increasing on [x * , ∞), it is easy to see that (A.3) has a solution if and only if c ≤ĉ. A similar argument shows that this holds when u 0 > x * as well. We can therefore define the function
Then (A.1) and (A.2) are equivalent with the existence of a c so that I(c) = K. By the implicit function theorem, u c is continuously differentiable w.r.t. c and I (c) = − uc u 0 g (y)dy < 0, i.e. I is continuous and strictly decreasing in c ∈ (0,ĉ). Also lim c→0 u c = ∞, hence lim c→0 I(c) = ∞ as well. Therefore, if we can prove that I(ĉ) ≤ 0, there must exist a uniquec ∈ (0,ĉ) so that I(c) = K.
To prove that I(ĉ) ≤ 0, assume first that u 0 ≤ x * . Then since g has a minimum at x * ,
and consequently
, and so I(ĉ) ≤ 0 again. Denoting the corresponding uc byū 0 so thatcg (ū 0 ) = k we can thus conclude that
Lemma A.4 Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.1, let V be as in Lemma A.3. Then
Proof. By Lemma A.2, it is sufficient to prove that V (u 0 ) < k. If u 0 ≥ x * the result is trivially true by convexity of g on [x * , ∞). Assume therefore that u 0 < x * and let V * (x) = c * g(x) be the optimal solution from Theorem 2.1. Assume thatc ≥ c * . Then since c * g (ū * ) =cg (ū 0 ) it is necessary thatū 0 ≤ū * . But then
a contradiction. Therefore,c < c * and by concavity of g on [u * , x * ],
Lemma A.5. Let V be as in Lemma A.3. Then V satisfies the quasi-variational inequalities
Proof. We first prove (A.5). Since LV (x) = 0 when x ≤ū 0 , assume that x >ū 0 . Since by Lemma A.3,ū 0 > x * , V (ū 0 −) > 0 while trivially V (ū 0 +) = 0. Using that V (x) = V (ū 0 ) + k(x −ū 0 ) we get by Assumption A4,
We proceed to prove (A.6). For x ∈ [0, u 0 ], M V (x) = −∞, hence the inequality is trivially satisfied. When x > u 0 , by Lemma A4 and the definition of V (x), V (x) < k when x ∈ [u 0 ,ū 0 ), and V (x) = k when x ∈ [ū 0 , ∞). Therefore the function V (x − η) + kη − K is increasing in η for nonnegative η and takes its maximum when η = x − u 0 . Hence, for x ∈ [u 0 ,ū 0 ),
For x ≥ū 0 we have
This also proves (A.7) since LV (x) = 0 for x ∈ (0,ū 0 ) and M V (x) = V (x) for x ∈ [ū 0 , ∞). Finally (A.8) follows by definition of V .
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let π ∈ Π 0 be an arbitrary strategy. By definition, V is continuously differentiable on (0, ∞) and twice continuously differentiable on (0,ū 0 ) ∪ (ū 0 , ∞). However, for x =ū 0 , the continuity of V might fail. Since {0 ≤ t < τ π : X π t =ū 0 } has Lebesgue measure zero under each P x , we can use Itô's formula, see e.g. [2] p.460, together with (A.5) to get
Here we can let V (ū 0 ) = V − (ū 0 ). Another argument for this formula would be to use Lemma A.8 below where now k = k1.
Since V is bounded and the process satisfies Assumptions A1-A4, it is fairly straightforward to show that
is a martingale. Taking expectations on both sides of (A.9) therefore yields
From (A.6) and the fact that X π
on {τ π n ≤ t ∧ τ π }. Then (A.10) and (A.11) together give
Letting t → ∞ in (A.12), we have by nonnegativity of V ,
which implies that V (x) ≥ V * 0 (x). Now consider the lump sum dividend barrier strategy πū 0 ,u 0 given in Theorem 3.1. Since
Therefore, the inequality in (A.9) becomes an equality with the strategy π 0 , i.e.
Assume that x = X 0 ≥ū 0 . Then
and ξ
We can conclude that
and
Also by boundedness of X π 0 t∧τ π 0 + and the fact that P (τ π 0 < ∞) = 1 and X π 0 τ π 0 + = 0, it follows from the bounded convergence theorem that
Therefore, taking expectations in (A.14) and then letting t → ∞ gives
which implies that V (x) ≤ V * 0 (x). In summary, we get V (x) = V * 0 (x) = Vū 0 ,u 0 (x). When the initial reserve X 0− = x <ū 0 , the result is proved similarly. To prove the last part of the theorem, let u * ≤ u 0 < u 1 , and let V i (x) = Vū i ,u i (x) be the two value functions. Write V i (x) =c i g(x) for x ∈ [0,ū i ]. By what we have just proved, V 0 (x) > V 1 (x), hencec 0 >c 1 . Therefore, for V i (ū i ) = k it is necessary thatū 1 >ū 0 . Now to the proof of Theorem 3.2. To prove that there is exactly one solution to the equations in Assumption D, just let V (x) =cg(x) so that we get the equation
Solving forc gives
Proof Sinceũ is an upper optimality point, see (3.3) and what follows there, by the previous analysis we know that the corresponding value function is
Define the function G as
dy,ũ ≤ x ≤ū 1 .
is increasing on [ũ,ū 1 ]. Therefore, G is a continuous and increasing function. Furthermore,
LetV be defined asV
Then LV (x) = 0 for 0 < x <ū 1 and by (A.16),
Using this together with (A.17) then gives for x >ū 1 ,
Therefore,V also solves Problem D, so by uniquenessV = V .
To finish the proof, let first x ∈ [u 1 ,ũ]. It follows from [7] when (ũ, u 1 ) = (ū * , u * ), and from Lemma A4 when (ũ,
Note that V (x) and V (x) exist and are continuous except for when x =ū 1 . Let V − (ū 1 ) and V + (ū 1 ) be the left derivative and right derivative of V (x) atū 1 . From Lemma A. 6 we can see that V − (ū 1 ) ≥ k = V + (ū 1 ). Therefore V (x) may fail to be differentiable at the pointū 1 if V − (ū 1 ) > k. Thus, the classical Itô formula can not be applied, but its generalization, the Meyer-Itô formula is applicable. Since we are working with functions of the form e −λt f (Y t ), the standard Meyer-Itô formula needs a slight, but straightforward, modification.
Lemma A.7. Let f be the difference of two convex functions and f − be its left derivative. Let
where L a t,0 is the local time of Y at a. Then for a semimartingale Y the following equation holds:
where µ is the signed measure (when restricted to compacts) which is the second derivative of f in the generalized function sense. Furthermore, for every bounded Borel measurable function v, 
Proof.
The first part follows from Theorem 70, Chapter IV, in [10] using that d(e −λt f (Y t )) = −λe −λt f (Y t )dt + e −λt df (Y t ) and Fubini's theorem on the local time term. Formula (A.18) follows from Corollary 1, Chapter IV, in [10] and an application of Fubini's theorem.
Lemma A.8. Let V be the solution of Problem D. Then, for π ∈ Π 1 , the following equation holds:
where k 1 is the left derivative of V (x) atū 1 .
Proof Since V (x) and V (x) exist and are continuous except for at x =ū 1 , and V ± (ū 1 ), V ± (ū 1 ) exist and are finite, some fairly straightforward calculations show that V (x) can be written as the difference of the two convex functions
where x + = max(x, 0) and x − = −min(x, 0). By the property of V (x), we have that
The identity (A.18) shows that
The result now follows from Lemma A.7.
Lemma A.9 Let V be the solution of Problem D and define the operator L − by
Then V satisfies the following quasi-variational inequalities
Here the operator M is as in (A.4), but with the lower limit there u 0 replaced by u 1 .
Proof By the construction of V (x), (A.19) holds. To prove (A.20), let x >ū 1 . Then
Since by Assumption A4, µ (x) ≤ λ, and the fact that V (x) = k on (ū 1 , ∞), the function µ(x)k − λV (x) is decreasing on (ū 1 , ∞). Therefore, Taking expectations and then letting t → ∞ results in V (x) = Vū 1 ,u 1 (x) which implies that V (x) ≤ V * 1 (x). Together with (A.23) we can therefore conclude that V * 1 (x) = V (x) = Vū 1 ,u 1 (x).
Proof of Theorem 4.1. By Theorem 2.1 and its proof in [7] , Vū ,u(ū) (x) is increasing inū. If u(ū) → ∞ asū → ∞, there is nothing to prove, so assume that u(ū) ≤ m for allū for some positive m. Given δ > 0, chooseū > b so large that Vū ,u(ū) (x) > V * (x) − δ 2 ∀x ∈ [0, b], and also so that lnū > m. Consider the two dividend barrier lump sum strategies:
1. The strategy π 0 = πū ,u(ū) .
2. The strategy π 1 = πū ,lnū .
The strategy π 1 clearly satisfies the conditions of the theorem. Let τ be the first time the process hitsū (with τ = ∞ if it hits 0 beforeū). By definition, τ is the same for both strategies when Another solution is then given as, see e.g. [12] p.31, Here we used Assumption A.1 in the first inequality, where c is a suitable positive constant.
Fitting the boundary conditions we get
Therefore, hū(x) ∼ (λū) −1 asū gets large and x is fixed, and this proves the result by (A.24), choosingū so large that V π 0 (x) − V π 1 (x) ≤ δ 2 for all x ∈ [0, b]. Note that in the proof we may have usedū γ with 0 < γ < 1 instead of lnū.
